Wittgenstein’s beetle or how to have a good philosophical argument.

*Discussion in Second Life, Sunday 14 Sept, 9pm GMT, 1pm SLT, to be led by Sojourna Alexandre (aka Kathryn Koromilas)*

I’ve just been thinking about Wittgenstein’s beetle analogy and the way we hold philosophical discussions.

Do you ever find that a philosophical debate goes in circles with no consensus even on the main points of the discussion topic or the main terms and language used? Sometimes, I think we rely too much on our own subjective meanings and understandings of words, language and philosophical ideas and concepts. And this is where we go wrong. (!?)

Wittgenstein says there is no private language. The language we use to convey things about our private world, to talk about our subjective sensations (of pain, for example), is language formed in the public sphere for the purpose of communicating in the public sphere. This language is guided by various rules, rules we form and agree on, and only has meaning when used in public discourse.

The word pain, therefore, cannot relate to our own personal sensation of pain, but instead only has meaning as some publicly agreed-upon understanding of the fact of pain.

Something like that anyway

Now, consider Wittgenstein’s analogy and our philosophical discussions:

We all arrive happily to philosophical discussions with our own “beetle in a box.” We all have a beetle in a box, but no one is allowed to look in another’s box and so no one ever knows what is in another’s box.

Yet, over time, as a philosophical discussion progresses, everyone talks about what is in their boxes, everyone calls it a beetle and in the end the word “beetle” comes to refer to what is in everyone’s boxes.

But we cannot know what is in another’s box! (Can we?) If we cannot know about the beetle in another’s box, then the word beetle has no meaning in reference to any private and subjective thing, because that thing cannot ever be known. If we try to use the word beetle to refer to what is in the box we are talking about nothing that can be known. In the end, we are making non-sense.

When we come to philosophical discussions, or any other public discourse activity, are we relying too much on our own *private language?*

Are we relying too much on our own private version of the subject? Do we believe that we can communicate to others this private experience of ours with the language tools we have learnt to use for public communication? Can we ever hope to convey something about our subjective senses when the only language tool we have at-hand is a public language? Should we even care? Is there a private language? Or, do you agree with Wittgenstein?

Wittgenstein says there is no private language. The language we use is meaningful only in its public use and this means that the meanings of words used in public discourse have been agreed upon by all who use them and refer to some entity or substance that exists and can be scrutinised. Whatever is going on in our heads, whatever type of beetle is in our box, cannot be communicated. Why? Because there is no language for that. There is no private language.

Well, that’s it for starters.

Event notice, questions and recommended reading (will be short!) to follow.

In fact, reading might just be this

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